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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the changing integration of Asian financial markets within the global financial 
network from 1995–2016, incorporating the direction of links between markets, the significance 
of these links, and their strength. Emphasis is placed on the transition of the networks before and 
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. The 
analysis demonstrates the increase in interconnectedness during periods of stress and the fall in the 
number of links in post-crisis periods. At the same time, the results reveal a general deepening of 
the connections of the Asian market with the rest of the world over the past two decades. They 
also suggest that many of these markets have transitioned from being primarily linked to the global 
markets via key bridge markets (such as Hong Kong) and over time developing stronger direct 
links with external markets. These findings highlight the potential importance of key geographical 
nodes in allowing emerging markets access to the international financial network. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, Asian markets have become more central in global 
output production and investment, shifting the center of the financial world steadily eastward 
(Quah 2011). In the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) April 2013 Triennial Central Bank 
Survey, transactions between the Chinese yuan and US dollar alone accounted for 2.1% of 
recorded foreign exchange transactions—up from a nonexistent presence in a 1998 survey. In 
2016, one-third of the top-15 equity markets by market capitalization were in Asia: in order, Japan; 
China; Hong Kong; India; and Australia. This growing international presence and market 
development in Asia suggests considerable change in the international network of financial 
linkages between countries and regions. This paper examines the development of the Asian 
markets using new methods of analyzing the changing financial interconnectedness through 
network finance, facilitating a clearer understanding of how financial stress transmits between 
markets.  
Theoretical frameworks which support network structures as at least partly responsible for the 
transmission of financial shocks include Allen and Babus (2009); Gai and Kapadia (2010); and 
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015). Data-based empirical work (as opposed to 
simulations) on the extent and changing nature of global financial networks has since appeared in 
Billio et al. (2012); Merton et al. (2013); Giraitis et al. (2016); and Diebold and Yilmaz (2015). 
The inclusion of Asian markets in these networks is less common, although recent literature 
includes Dungey, Harvey, and Volkov (2017); Giudici and Spelta (2016); Demirer et al. (2015); 
Wang, Xie, and Stanley (2018); and Raddant and Kenett (2016). 
The paper focuses on a 21-year period from 1995 to 2016 covering both the global financial and 
the Asian financial crises (GFC and AFC), and examines the transmission of shocks to market 
returns between 42 equity markets, divided into 5 regions (Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, 
Latin America, and North America, see Table 1 for more detail).1  
                                               
1 The Asian markets include Australia; Hong Kong; India; Indonesia; Japan; Malaysia; New Zealand; Pakistan;  China; 
the Philippines; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Taiwan; and Thailand.  
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In that 21 years—in addition to increasing global financialization and financial liberalization and 
the deepening of many markets—markets have experienced several periods of financial crises.  
We divide the sample into six distinct periods: (i) The lead-up to the Asian financial crisis (January 
3, 1995 to July 1, 1997), (ii) the Asian financial crisis (July 2, 1997 to December 31, 1998) , (iii) 
Post-Asian financial crisis (January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2002) (iv) the lead-up to the global 
financial crisis (January 1, 2003 to September 14, 2008), (v) the Global financial crisis  (September 
15, 2008 to March 31, 2010) and (v) Post-global financial crisis (April 1, 2010 to December 30, 
2016).  Although we are able to define the lead-up and crisis periods relatively clearly. In each 
case the post-crisis period contains ongoing crises in other regions or asset markets of the world—
the post-AFC period includes the dotcom crisis in the United States (US) and a number of South 
American problems (see Dungey et al. 2010), while the post-GFC period includes the significant 
problems in the European sovereign debt markets.  
Our application uses data from equity markets. We consider both the statistical significance of the 
potentially changing linkages between the markets in each of the 6 phases, their direction, and how 
they change across periods. The choice of dataset is controversial in the literature—much of the 
existing theory revolves around formal bank balance sheet flows. However, there are good reasons 
to consider links between the prices expressed in other markets. First, the market prices represent 
market sentiment, even where this may be a misrepresentation of the underlying conditions (such 
as in bubbles). Second, as shown in Pesaran and Yang (2016), a system of interconnected 
quantities, such as flows of goods between firms can also be expressed in terms of an equivalent 
form in prices, known in economics as its dual.  The form in prices provides a convenient 
transformation of theories for network connections constructed around financial flows to a more 
empirically tractable specification expressed in prices. Finally, there is genuine concern that 
policies to change networks in one specific arena—such as bank liabilities—is likely to simply 
force shock transmissions into networks in other markets. For example, equity-market linkages are 
likely to be heightened in the presence of policy initiatives, such as 2016’s “Minneapolis Plan to 
End Too Big to Fail” from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, which focuses on absorbing 
losses in equity markets. If shocks are to be primarily distributed through equity markets, as 
opposed to increasing debt market financing during periods of stress, then equity markets are likely 
to become even more important in transmitting stress than in previous periods.  
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An important contribution from network finance to the management of systemic risk and financial 
monitoring is the potential to improve the transparency of the highly complex international systems 
(see Haldane (2009) and Yellen (2013) , for example, and Hughes and Malone (2016)  for an 
industry perspective). Improving understanding of network dynamics may help understand and 
hence calm shocks. If policy makers and actors in the system can anticipate how a network will 
change when under stress, then perhaps the network can remain “robust” rather than “fragile” when 
faced with a crisis-triggering shock. Hüser (2015) posits a direct link with the empirical features 
of robust-but-fragile networks; robust networks can weather random shocks, but direct threats to 
the core of the network lead to network fragility. Network methods can be used to identify and 
monitor nodes that are particularly important in spreading shocks. Nodes that build critical bridges 
between regions may be super-spreaders or super-absorbers and are each important to the policy 
maker. Critical bridges (or gatekeepers) represent the case where a node forms a link between 
major groups of markets, where there are relatively few (or no) other pathways that can be easily 
substituted. The loss of a critical bridge may lead to isolation of part of the network and reduce the 
network’s ability to absorb or contain shocks. That is, it matters where in the network a shock 
occurs. 
Systemic risk is associated with both too-big-to-fail and too-interconnected-to-fail hypotheses in 
the literature. There is some debate as to which of these may be more important. Hughes and 
Malone (2016) prefer to focus on interconnectedness, but most research recognizes that they are 
two distinct and important effects; current BIS rules for identifying global systemically important 
banks include measures to incorporate both effects. Proposals such as the Minneapolis Plan (2016) 
place the emphasis on equity capital, reasoning that smaller interconnected firms will be more 
easily managed (presumably the network is closer to random). Understanding the topography of 
the financial network helps provide recommendations for intervention to prevent or reduce 
systemic risk spreading. Isolating (or inoculating) a particular node may dramatically improve 
outcomes for the whole system (Hüser 2015). While a random network may have a lower 
propensity to fail, it may also cascade more dramatically when stressed.  
The depth of the linkages shocks invade is also important in managing crisis risks. Currently, the 
evidence on the average length of “paths” is mixed. Haldane (2009) suggests long paths for 
interbank transactions, while Gençay et al. (2015) suggest that paths for each node are mainly of 
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degree one (that is, only immediate neighbors). Short paths for markets which are not highly 
connected to others may be of little importance for systemic risk, while highly connected markets 
with long tails of linkages may cause considerable concern.  
A number of recently recommended changes to market regulation involve modifying networks in 
a way that mitigates their complexity and, potentially, dimension (see Haldane 2009). To discuss 
this proposal requires a means of understanding and measuring network performance, 
characteristics, and the identification of critical links (and potential dominant nodes in the meaning 
of Pesaran and Yang, 2016).2 Identifying critical links and dominant nodes provides a useful 
structure for policy makers in considering how to mitigate systemic risk. However, altering the 
topology of one network—the literature largely focuses on banking and financial institutions—
may shift sources of stress may simply shift to another part of the financial system. Arregui et al. 
(2013) highlight the introduction of tougher capital controls as a risk in exacerbating transmissions 
in the sovereign debt-bank network; for evidence of these spirals see Dungey, Harvey, and Volkov 
(2017). Rather than adding to the requirements for large institutions, Markose, Giansante, and 
Shaghaghi (2012) suggest a tax on super-spreaders (being markets which transmit shocks to a large 
number of other markets), emphasizing the role of interconnectedness. Calls to reduce banks’ 
dependence on raising debt during periods of stress and instead relying on equity market funding, 
as in the Minneapolis Plan (2016), may well, similarly, heighten transmission in international 
equity markets.  
In reality, the financial system is made up of multilayered networks to capture the many potential 
forms that links between nodes may take. Research in this field is in its infancy, but Aldasoro and 
Alves (2017) provide a recent application for European banks. Multilayered networks have so far 
considered multiple balance sheet measures of links between financial institutions but can 
contribute to the debate in the literature on whether contingent claims or balance sheet data are 
substitutes or complements for market-based data in understanding network structures. The 
arguments against market-based data are that this approach omits non-listed institutions and does 
not pick up market mispricing (see Arregui et al. 2013). Rather than ruling out one to justify the 
                                               
2 Currently, the methodology in Pesaran and Yang (2016) does not simply transform financial markets, due to several 
structural assumptions in the formation of the dual function. Dominant nodes are similar to nodes that may be both 
super-absorbers and super-spreaders. 
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other, as in much of the current literature, it is likely that both are informative and that use of 
multilayer approaches will enable a richer analysis.  
In summary, network analysis may contribute to policy decision-making by improving the 
transparency of complex systems, identify distinguishing features of the system (such as centrality, 
critical nodes) and too-interconnected nodes, provide guidance on reducing complexity and where 
interventions may be useful. Finally analysis consider the multilayer nature of financial networks 
with attention to how regulatory structures in one layer may flow into others.  
We find distinct evidence of complex and changing networks over time. Our results show that 
there are clear networks within the Asian region, and between the Asian region and other regional 
cluster and these networks are both complex and changing over time.  In this way, the results 
mirror those of Wang et al. (2018), which examine a correlation-based network between 57 
international equity markets and find distinct evidence of regions. Wang et al. (2018) find evidence 
of critical linkages between Asia and the rest of the world’s equity markets; consequently, the 
second half of this paper shifts the focus to the role of markets that act as critical bridges between 
the region and the rest of the world, and how this has evolved over time. The role of the bridge 
market may be critical to the development of emerging markets, although we show that not all 
markets choose to go this way. The empirical evidence from the past 20 years provides instances 
of markets which seem to have benefited from a relationship with a regional bridge market, those 
which have chosen not to use a regional bridge but to concentrate on directly accessing the global 
network, those which have chosen to become a bridge market, and what takes place in each of 
these scenarios during periods of financial stress. Clear advantages exist to protecting emerging 
markets from crises if they are sheltered behind a regional node, as policy makers can concentrate 
on protecting that critical link to international markets. Disadvantages to this model may also exist, 
such as managing the transition to direct integration, and the potential cost to the bridge node of 
being caught in a crisis not of its own making. Policy makers in each market and region need to 
weigh the relative risks of each strategy. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the literature on financial 
market integration and network applications in finance. Section 3 outlines the methodologies used 
in the construction of the financial networks. Section 4 describes the data used in this paper with 
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some stylized facts. Section 5 presents the main findings of this network study. Section 6 discusses 
the role of the financial network in shaping policy reforms, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Institution-level systemic risk may be thought of either as a financial institution's contribution to 
the overall systemic risk of the financial system or as the institution's exposure to the overall 
systemic risk of the financial system. Aggregate systemic risk may also be estimated by calculating 
the likelihood of a system-wide systemic crisis. Bisias et al. (2012) comprehensively survey 
systemic-risk measures. One approach to estimating the impact of individual institutions on 
aggregate systemic risk uses tail events. For example, the CAViaR model of Engle and Manganelli 
(2004) and the CoVAR model of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). Acharya et al. (2017) propose 
the “marginal expected shortfall” as the expected losses of an institution when the system as a 
whole is in distress (marginal expected shortfall can be interpreted as the per dollar systemic risk 
contribution of this institution). The NYU-Stern Vlab project maintains SRISK measures using a 
weighted average of the institution’s marginal expected shortfall and its leverage (Acharya et al. 
2017; Brownlees and Engle 2017). Allen, Bali, and Tang (2012) estimate an aggregate systemic 
risk measure that incorporates both “variance at risk” and expected shortfall methodologies. They 
show that their method is bank-specific, and that the ability of their indicator to predict crises is 
contained within the financial institutions data and does not extend to non-financial firms.  
The contribution of a firm to systemic risk may be measured as either the value of the cooperation 
of the firm in the system—Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) estimate systemic risk 
contributions by calculating the Shapley value of a financial institution3—or, more commonly, the 
loss of the system due to an institutional default. Chan‐ Lau (2010) estimates the difference 
between the aggregate loss distribution of the financial system when a financial institution defaults 
and the aggregate loss distribution of the financial system when a financial institution is solvent 
                                               
3 The Shapley value comes from game theory and indicates the value of an entity in achieving a cooperative solution. 
This is extended to the concept of contribution to systemic risk in this paper. 
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and creates a capital charge for institutions which are deemed “too-connected-to-fail." A related 
concept is the insurance premium for the case of a system-wide tail event, estimated as the Distress 
Insurance Premium by Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2012). The systemic risk contribution of a financial 
institution is then the marginal contribution of the financial institution to the overall risk premium. 
Capuano (2008) estimates the “option implied probability of default”, which estimates the default 
probability of the financial system using equity-option data. Segoviano Basurto and Goodhart 
(2009) estimate a systemic risk measure that utilizes the system's multivariate density function and 
allows for the calculation of the distress contributed to the system by a single financial institution, 
as well as distress between banks. Finally, Giglio (2011) derives a system default probability based 
on credit default swap data. 
Aggregate systemic risk may also be estimated using stress test methodologies as practiced by a 
number of central banks and international regulators; see BIS (2009). Duffie (2013) advises 
regulators to concentrate on important financial institutions and their reactions to different stress 
scenarios. For each situation, a financial institution calculates the profit or loss on its positions for 
each counterparty to which it has the largest exposure, relative to all other counterparties. 
Alternatively, Alfaro and Drehmann (2009) propose modelling stress around gross domestic 
product (GDP) shocks. This method models GDP growth as an autoregressive process, as the 
authors note that GDP growth typically drops prior to a banking crisis. 
Another set of methods estimates aggregate systemic risk by measuring the illiquidity of financial 
institutions. Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) examine arbitrage capital in the market and its effect on 
the price differences of US Treasuries. During crisis, less arbitrage capital is available, and yields 
on Treasuries are more volatile. Khandani and Lo (2011) measure the liquidity of equity markets 
using the profitability of buying losers and selling winners. When this method is more profitable, 
the markets are less liquid. They also examine changes in the Kyle (1985) lambda, which calculates 
the volume required to move the price of a given stock by one dollar. Finally, hedge funds data, 
are examined in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004); Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2005, 
2006); and Pojarliev and Levich (2011), to examine the liquidity of financial markets. 
Another stream of literature uses some form of balance sheet analysis; including contingent claims, 
as in Lehar (2005); Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007) and Gray and Jobst (2011), and the interbank 
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market in Giraitis et al. (2016). Fender and McGuire (2010) focus on group-level balance sheet 
risk and how cross-border linkages of financial institutions can create shocks from one country to 
another. There is strong cross-over between the approaches of these papers and those directly in 
the network finance literature. 
Finally, a growing body of literature examines aggregate systemic risk measures through network 
connections. The theoretical network literature is large, but recently Acemoglu et al. (2015) 
provide a modelling framework to motivate the relationships between financial institutions and 
real economy firms in the form of networks, and Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) show the mapping 
between the network approach and vector autoregression methods. Chan-Lau, Espinosa, and Sole 
(2009) examine the network externalities of bank failures through a matrix of between-institution 
exposures. Simulations calculate the effect on the financial system of a bank's default, allowing 
designation of systemically important financial institutions. Billio et al. (2012) propose a principal 
components analysis method to augment bivariate network links established through Granger 
Causality. Principal component analysis is used to extract the commonality of returns among 
financial institutions, and increases in this value are associated with increasing systemic risk. 
Kritzman et al. (2011) also use a principal component analysis methodology to estimate the 
common components of systemic distress. Network analysis techniques are being rapidly adopted 
from areas such as biology and computational science, including the use of the PageRank 
algorithm, which powers internet search engines, in Dungey, Luciani, and Veredas (2013) and van 
de Leur, Lucas, and Seeger (2017), and spanning trees in Anufriev and Panchenko (2015).  
The closest current works to this paper that include Asian markets are Wang et al. (2018), who 
examine connectedness between 57 global markets from 2005–2014, and Raddant and Kenett 
(2016), who consider a network of stocks across 15 countries, including 6 from our focus group 
of Asian markets. Raddant and Kenett (2016) find that Asia is relatively disconnected from the 
rest of the world markets and while country-based nodes are formed there is little evidence of a 
regional cluster (ultimately we find this is unsurprising given their choice of Asian markets). Wang 
et al. (2018) use a spanning tree approach and find that Japan forms a critical bridge node to the 
rest of Asia, consistent with our findings below for the later part of our sample.  
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3. NETWORK MEASURES AND APPROACH 
This paper proposes a new way of examining the changes in financial networks over time. We test 
for changes in the existence, number and strength of links between financial markets. The results 
show the developing profile of Asian financial markets in a global network over a 20 year period 
containing two important periods of crisis. We compare the evolution of the network before, during 
and after two different crises (East Asian in 1997-1998 and GFC in 2008-09) and provide statistical 
evidence based on weighted networks and Jaccard similarity coefficients to assess the impact of 
the crises along with the increasingly interconnected Asian markets. Our focus on evidence for the 
changing number and strengths of links (or edges) between the nodes (equity markets) in the 
network differentiates the work from those which focus exclusively on the net change in the 
number of statistically significant links, such as Billio et al. (2012) or solely on the strength (but 
not statistical significance) of the linkages, such as Diebold and Yilmaz (2014, 2015).  
Our approach extends existing work by implementing an adjacency matrix which incorporates the 
spillover strengths filtered by the statistical significance of the links. In this way, we omit 
spuriously large but insignificant links. We consider not only the net change in links between 
nodes, but also the evolution of the Jaccard similarity coefficient, which provides information on 
the number of links between sample periods. The changing nature of the network leads us to 
consider not only the degrees and centrality measures of the networks, but also to an analysis of 
the number and strength of links that are extinguished and those that are formed. For example, in 
terms of the weighted completeness of the network, a result that may at first appear as a net increase 
in links may in fact represent a reduction in strong linkages and proliferation of weaker links.  
Our approach embeds existing definitions of contagion within a network representation of 
systemic risk. In particular, when links fail between nodes during periods of stress, this is evidence 
of the form of contagion proposed in Gai and Kapadia (2010), when the breakdown of the network 
results from contagion due to failing counterparty arrangements. Alternatively, when new links 
are formed between nodes during periods of stress, this increases the number of connections, akin 
to the traditional Forbes and Rigobon (2002) definition of markets becoming more interconnected 
during crises. To date, the literature finds evidence of both of these contagion routes but does not 
effectively reconcile them into a single framework. That is the aim of this background paper. 
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The paper draws on the methodological approaches developed in Dungey et al. (2017) in 
developing a network of financial linkages between nodes (represented by country index equity 
market data) where the links between them (edges) are determined by an adjacency matrix, which 
includes both the direction and strength of those links and a measure of their statistical significance. 
The relative strengths of the links is determined by using the Diebold and Yilmaz (DY) (2009, 
2014) forecast error variance decomposition approach—where the sources of observed volatility  
are attributed to shocks in source nodes. The DY approach has the advantage of allowing the 
researcher to vary the horizon of shock examined. We couple this with the Granger-causality 
approach of authors such as Billio et al. (2012) who consider the statistical power of the existence 
of links between nodes. If one node Granger causes the other at a statistically significant level 
(selected by the researcher) then this link is indicated as existing in the network. If the Granger 
causality is not significant, then the link is nonexistent. In this way, we use the Granger-causality 
approach to weed the spuriously large (poorly estimated) linkages from the adjacency matrix 
provided by the DY approach. This combines measures of existence, direction, and size of the 
edges. From this perspective we claim that a more globally interconnected market would contain 
a larger proportion of significant links. A simple count of unweighted links may not indicate a 
more globally connected network than a count of weighted nodes in an unweighted networks. As 
there are two components to the globalization here it’s usage will currently depend on the emphasis 
of the user (as shown in the Tables which follow in the Application). 
3.1. Methodology 
To measure the connectedness between entities, we identify statistically significant relations by 
applying Granger causality tests to establish the edges and their direction. Granger causality tests 
suggest causality if past values of one-time series, 𝑌𝑖, stock return series in our case, contain 
information that help forecast another return series, 𝑌𝑠. 
These causality links can be assessed using a VAR 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝑐 + ∑ Φ𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 ,                                                                                                           (1) 
where k is the number of lags, and Φ𝑗 and 𝑐 are parameters of the model. The Wald statistic 
to test for Granger causality between stock returns has the form: 
𝑊𝑇 = [𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝐼𝐼)̂]´ [𝑒 (𝑉 ⊗ (𝑌´?̂?)
−1
) 𝑒´]
−1
[𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝐼𝐼)̂],                                                            (2) 
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in which 𝑌 is the matrix of independent variables from (1), 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝐼?̂?) denotes the row vectorised 
coefficients of 𝐼?̂? = [Φ1, … , Φ𝑘] , ?̂? = 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝜀?̂?
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝜀´?̂? and 𝑒 is the k × 2(2k + 1) selection 
matrix defined as 
𝑒 = [
0 1
0 0
  
0 0
0 1
  
⋯ 0
⋯ 0
  
0 ⋯
0 ⋯
   
0 0
0 0
⋮ ⋮
0 0
  
⋮ ⋮
0 1
⋮ ⋱
⋯ 0
  
⋮ ⋮
0 ⋯
   
⋮ ⋮
0 0
]                                                                           (3) 
Each row of 𝑒 picks one of the coefficients to set to zero under the non-causal hypothesis 
𝑌𝑖 → 𝑌𝑠. Then, Granger causality test results can be summarized as binary entries of matrix 
𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗]                                                                                  (4) 
where, 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
         0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑌𝑗  ,
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑌𝑗           
                                                (5) 
The second aspect is the strength of the links, which we examine by assigning weights, Wij, to each 
of the significant relationships existing in the network. We use the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) 
framework of a generalized variance decomposition to obtain these weights and to obtain the 
weight matrix Wij = [𝑤𝑖𝑗]. The spillover measure is based on forecast error variance 
decompositions. The contribution of shocks to variable j to the H step ahead generalized forecast 
error variance of entity i, 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻), is represented by 
𝜃𝑖𝑔
𝑔 (𝐻) =
𝑉𝑗𝑗
−1 ∑ (𝑒´𝑖𝐵ℎ𝑉𝑒𝑗)
2𝐻−1
ℎ=0
∑ (𝑒´𝑖𝐵ℎ𝑉𝐵´ℎ𝑒𝑗)
𝐻−1
ℎ=0
,                                                                          (6) 
where, H = 1,2,3,..., and V is the variance covariance matrix for the error term εt, Vjj is the standard 
deviation of the jth error term and ei is the selection vector with one as the ith element and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient matrices, Bi, obey the recursion 𝐵𝑖 =  𝜙1𝐵𝑖−1 + 𝜙2𝐵𝑖−2 + ⋯ + 𝜙𝑘𝐵𝑖−𝑘 
with B0 an n×n identity matrix and Bi = 0 for i < 0. Each entry of the generalized variance 
decomposition is normalized by the row sum as 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 =
𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔
(𝐻)
∑ 𝜃
𝑖𝑗
𝑔 (𝐻)𝑛𝑗=1
 ,                                                                                                                        (7) 
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where ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1
𝑛
𝑗=1   and ∑ = 𝑛
𝑛
𝑖𝑗=1 . We denote the values defined in (7) as DY weights. 
The structure of the weighted network is defined by combining matrices A and W resulting in the 
adjacency matrix ?̃? defined as  
?̃? = 𝐴 ⊙ 𝑊,                                                                              (8) 
where ⊙ is the Hadamard product. Elements of adjacency matrix ?̃? capture the connectedness 
between entities conditional on significant causal linkages between them. Henceforth, we will call 
them GDY weights. The system-wide completeness of the network is measured as 
𝐶 =
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖,𝑗=1𝑖≠𝑗
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖,𝑗=1𝑖≠𝑗
.                                                                (9) 
in case of a large shock in any part of the network. 
This papers concerned with the changing nature of the network over the sample period. The 
adjacency matrix may change due to changes in the weight matrix, W, and/or the significant entries 
in the matrix A. The changes in the A matrix link the specification directly to the literature assessing 
links during crises; for example Granger, Huang, and Yang (2000) assess changing Granger 
causality links in the Asian markets between 1986 and 1998 . To illustrate how this may apply in 
the current framework, consider the example of linkages between a pair of assets in a 2-node 
example (we stress that this is for illustrative purposes—the Granger causality relationships used 
in the empirical application are drawn from the VAR Model of the entire system with a Wald test 
approach as outlined in equations (2) to (3)). Consider a bivariate vector autoregression with one 
lag between 𝑌1𝑡 and 𝑌2𝑡 
𝑌1𝑡 =  𝑐1 + 𝜗11𝑌1𝑡−1 + 𝜗12𝑌2𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡                                              (10) 
 
𝑌2𝑡 =  𝑐2 + 𝜗21𝑌1𝑡−1 + 𝜗22𝑌2𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑡                                    (11) 
which can be compactly written in matrix form as 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + Θ𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,                                                (12)  
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where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector [𝑌1𝑡 𝑌2𝑡]′, c is the 2x1 vector of constants, Θ is the 2x2 matrix of coefficients 
and 𝜀𝑡 is the 2 x1 vector of residuals. 
The Granger causality test is essentially a test of significance of the off-diagonal elements of the 
coefficient matrix in (12). That is, whether 𝜗12 and/or 𝜗21 are non-zero. To extend this to evidence 
for contagion and the changing nature of networks, we may consider comparing these coefficients 
across two sample periods. If, in period 1, 𝜗12 is statistically significant, but in period 2 it is not, 
then the link has been lost between the two periods—consistent with contagion through breakdown 
of linkages as per Gai and Kapadia (2010). Alternatively, if the link 𝜗12 is insignificant in period 
1, but significant in period 2, then the evidence is consistent with contagion through the formation 
of new linkages, such as in the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach.  
We use the Jaccard similarity coefficient to examine just how many of the edges identified in each 
subsample are retained between samples. Papers such as Billio et al. (2012) are concerned only 
with the net formation of new links, but we find that it is important to consider the gross 
movements to obtain a clearer picture. The Jaccard similarity coefficient considers what portion 
of the edges in two networks are formed by the same edges, and is formed as a ratio of the 
intersection of the sets of links in two networks, Q and R, to the union of the sets of links in two 
networks as follows: 
               𝐽(𝑄, 𝑅) =
𝑛(𝑄∩𝑅)
𝑛(𝑄∪𝑅)
=
𝑛(𝑄∩𝑅)
𝑛(𝑄)+𝑛(𝑅)−𝑛(𝑄∩𝑅)
  .                                                (13) 
When the statistically significant links in A are weighted by DY weights, it is possible that the W 
matrix may change between periods. In this way the completeness of the network (as per equation 
(9)) may change, either due to changes in the number of links, and/or changes in the relative 
strength of those links. As we will show, this effect seems to be important in distinguishing the 
nature of the evolving network and seems to be particularly the case in understanding the transition 
from the build up to a crisis and the crisis itself. 
4. DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS 
The dataset includes 15 Asian daily equity market indices (in local currencies) for 1995–2016 from 
Thompson Reuters Datastream. These are augmented by the daily (closing) equity market indices 
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for 27 other countries, all listed by region in Table 1. Unit root tests reveal the usual characteristics 
of stationary returns in each series. The analysis is conducted using de-meaned returns (as the 
mean is usually extremely close to zero and, as we are focused on variance decompositions, this 
assumption is innocuous). Analysis of the complete network, consisting of 42 nodes, forms the 
initial benchmark for the study.  
To construct our network, we use the data with its recorded local closing time date. The choice of 
time zone treatment can have dramatic effects; no one choice is dominant due to the complications 
of wanting to test for two-way causality. Other researchers have used the dates as provided with 
the data (Wang et al. 2018), averaged data over consecutive days (Forbes and Rigobon 2002) or 
used time-matched data series (Kleimeier, Lehnert, and Verschoor 2008). Although the last of 
these is arguably the most appropriate, it is difficult to obtain this data for the markets examined 
here and to control for problems associated with out-of-local trading time liquidity effects (most 
markets have different price-impact effects during local and nonlocal trading). The averaging 
procedure used by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) introduces a moving average bias into the problem, 
and, with Granger-causality testing, produces additional problems with the performance of the 
statistic. And the use of lagged or non-lagged samples is dogged by argument as to whether this 
introduces or reduces noise in the process. Sensitivity analysis to different choices of date-lagging 
produced important differences; the most pronounced of these is that when US data are lagged 
there is virtually no evidence of transmission from the US to Asia, which seems at odds with our 
understanding of international financial markets and the transmission of shocks. Consequently, 
this paper uses the convention of actual day dating in its analysis. 
Table 1: Markets Grouped by Region 
Europe Asia and the Pacific Africa North America Latin America 
Austria Australia Egypt Canada Argentina 
Belgium China South Africa United States Brazil 
Czech Republic Japan     Chile 
Denmark India     Mexico 
Finland Indonesia       
France Hong Kong       
Germany Malaysia       
Greece New Zealand       
Hungary Pakistan       
Ireland Philippines       
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Italy Singapore       
Netherlands Republic of Korea       
Poland Sri Lanka       
Portugal Taiwan       
Spain Thailand       
Sweden         
Switzerland         
Turkey         
United Kingdom         
We first examine the evolution of the unweighted and weighted networks over the sample period 
and then augment this analysis with scenarios based around alternative clusterings of markets, as 
per the Asian Development Bank member countries and the role of regional groupings including 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with other regions across the globe. 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the statistically significant links between each of the country nodes in 
the sample using just the Granger causality test results over the entire sample period (1995–2016). 
It immediately points to the complexity of the relationships between nodes—there are 1,722 
(= 42! 40!⁄ ) possible connections between the nodes. It is evident that the markets involved are 
heavily interconnected, but it is difficult analytically to say more from this diagram. 
In Figure 1б panel A, the unweighted network is represented with the Granger Causality results 
grouped regionally (using the groupings in Table 1). The primary focus of this paper is the Asian 
economies, which are represented in light green, grouped in the center of each figure. The sizes of 
each node reflect the number of links to and from of that node—for example, it is evident that the 
United States has many connections over the sample period. We augment these simple directional 
graphs with weights drawn from the DY method to obtain a weighted directional network of the 
nodes in Panel B of Figure 1. It identifies both the nodes with the largest connections and with 
statistically significant links. Some nodes are relatively isolated—in this picture, Pakistan is a 
relatively isolated node, while Sri Lanka is an end node (that is, it is joined by only a few edges to 
other nodes in the system). The diagram also illustrates the clear, relatively strong significance of 
the relationships between the European markets (colored magenta) in the sample, particularly those 
which are members of the euro area. The linkages between the markets are also directional, as 
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given by the arrows at the ends of each edge—while some are double-ended, implying Granger 
causality in both directions (such as Hong Kong and Singapore), others are not (the link between 
Thailand and Malaysia is shown running in one direction only). 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Network Plots for Entire Sample  
A. Unweighted with Regions indicated B. Weighted with regions indicated 
 
 
Notes: Sample period: 1 March 1995 to 30 December 2016. Regions are color-coded as Asia (light green), Europe 
(magenta), North America (dark green), South America (blue), Africa (orange), as defined in Table 1. The figure displays 
the returns-based network of 42 equity markets. Edges were calculated using bivariate Granger causality tests between 
markets at the 5% level of significance.  Edge thickness is proportional to the intensity of the edge strength. Node color 
is proportion to the regional grouping while the node size is proportion to its degree. 
 
The thickness of the lines in panel B indicates the relative strength as well as statistical significance 
of the links. Thus, it is immediately evident that the US and France are strongly connected to others 
(a similar role for France is found in Wang et al. (2018)). Within the Asian focus of this paper 
there are clearly strong links between Hong Kong and the United States, and slightly less so for 
Hong Kong and Canada. Hong Kong is also strongly linked to Malaysia and Singapore, as well as 
slightly less strongly to a raft of other economies. Other distinctly strong linkages occur between 
European countries such as Finland and Sweden, the UK and Italy and so on. The links between 
the European countries are stronger (in DY weights) than those detected for most of the Asian 
economies, which is probably unsurprising as many of them were members of a common currency 
union for a large part of the sample period. 
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A distinct disadvantage of Figure 1 is the span of the sample covered. There have been many 
changes in world financial markets in this period—including the introduction of the euro; the float 
of many Asian currencies; increasing financialization of emerging markets in Asia, Africa and 
South America; more liberated international capital markets; and capital deepening in many areas. 
In addition, there have been several financial crises. 
We consequently divide our sample into six subsample periods. Each of Figures 2 and 3 has panels 
A to F representing the networks in each of these six phases. The phases are selected based 
primarily on a desire to examine how the network of Asian markets has changed over the sample 
period. The sample periods are divided as represented in Table 2, Figure 2 illustrates the 
unweighted networks, with panels A to F corresponding to phases 1 to 6. 
Table 2: Time Series Observation in Each Subsample Period 
Phase Period Represents Observations 
All Phases 01.03.1995–30.12.2016  5,738 
Phase 1 01.03.1995–01.07.1997 Pre-AFC period 650 
Phase 2 02.07.1997–31.12.1998 AFC period 391 
Phase 3 01.01.1999–31.12.2002 Post-AFC 1,042 
Phase 4 01.01.2003–14.09.2008 Lead-up to the GFC 1,287 
Phase 5 15.09.2008–31.03.2010 GFC 602 
Phase 6 01.04.2010–30.12.2016 Post-IMF program approval 
in Greece 
1,761 
AFC = Asian financial crisis, GFC= global financial crisis, IMF= International monetary fund 
 
To avoid complications in naming our choice of periods in the literature, particularly for choosing 
end points of each sample, we refer to each of these subperiods simply as phases within the total 
sample. Table 2 indicates the number of time series observations in each subsample. The total 
number of observations in the whole sample is 5,738; in each subsample, the number of 
observations varies, with Phase 2 the lowest (391), and Phase 6 the highest (1,761). However, 
these phases correspond strongly with periods of interest. Phase 1 represents the period in the lead-
up to the Asian crisis of 1997–1998 and Phase 2 covers the generally accepted duration of that 
crisis (see Dungey, Fry, and Martin 2006). Phase 4 covers the recognized lead-up to the global 
financial crisis pre-2008, and Phase 5 the usual period of the global financial crisis itself (see 
Dungey, Milunovich, Thorp, and Yang 2015). Consequently, Phases 1 and 4 both represent periods 
of lead-up to crisis, Phases 2 and 5 are periods of crisis, and Phases 3 and 6 are to some extent 
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recovery periods, although this is clouded by the dotcom crisis in 2001 in Phase 3 and the stress in 
sovereign debt markets post-2010. Our area of interest is to examine not only the networks in those 
periods, but also the transitions which occur in these networks between the different phases. In this 
way, we will generalize about the number of characteristics of networks as they enter and exit 
crisis conditions. Our findings are reinforced by those for the large network (107 nodes) of credit 
default swaps (CDS) issuers examined in Dungey et al. (2017), even though market coverage in 
that paper was more specifically geared towards individual financial institutions and sovereign 
issuers rather than the equity market indicators used here. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of Unweighted Networks 
A. Phase 1 B. Phase 2 C. Phase 3 
   
D. Phase 4 E. Phase 5 F. Phase 6 
   
Notes: Sample period: 1 March 1995 to 30 December 2016. Regions are color-coded as Asia (light green), Europe (magenta), North America (dark green),       
South America (blue), Africa (orange), as defined in Table 1. The figure displays the returns-based network of 42 equity markets. Edges were calculated using 
bivariate Granger causality tests between markets at the 5% level of significance Node color is proportion to the regional grouping while the node size is proportion 
to its degree. 
 
 
. 
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5.1. Changing Network Links Over Time 
Figure 3 illustrates the changing nature of the weighted financial network over the six phases 
defined in the previous section. Table 3 provides the associated network statistics. 
 
Table 3: Statistics Used for Analysis of Network Structures (All Countries) 
 
Panel A 
      
  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
Average strength 0.0260 0.0235 0.0236 0.0276 0.0260 0.0225 
Number of edges 210 305 214 237 389 306 
Completeness 0.2570 0.2252 0.1820 0.2034 0.2734 0.1990 
Panel B      
Edges Formed  
Phase 1–Phase 2  Phase 2–Phase 3 Phase 3–Phase 4 Phase 4–Phase 5 Phase 5–Phase 6 
0.0194 0.0169 0.0208 0.0225 0.0211 
264 159 180 306 233 
0.1608 0.0968 0.1163 0.1864 0.1424 
Edges Removed  
Phase 1–Phase 2  Phase 2–Phase 3 Phase 3–Phase 4 Phase 4–Phase 5 Phase 5–Phase 6 
0.0206 0.0196 0.0180 0.0207 0.0229 
169 250 157 154 316 
0.1640 0.1536 0.1020 0.0994 0.1957 
Note: The average link strength is estimated from the connectedness of each respective network. The number of 
edges was calculated using bivariate Granger causality tests between network nodes (entities). 
. 
The first impression from panels A to B in Figure 3 is that the density of the network has changed 
substantially over time. The figures give the impression of becoming darker and thicker—that is, 
more connected, in a similar manner to the changes noted by Billio et al. (2012) and Merton et al. 
(2013) for several forms of financial intermediaries in the US and European markets. However, 
Table 3 reveals that the number of statistically significant edges in the network has grown less 
monotonically than the panels may suggest. In Phase 1, 210 of the possible 1,722 linkages were 
statistically significant. This is only 12.2% of all the possible linkages. However, this number grew 
dramatically, by 45% to 305 links in Phase 2, before returning to close to the pre-crisis period 
numbers in Phase 3. In Phase 4, the build-up to the global financial crisis, the number of links 
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increased in the system, up by 10%, but in Phase 5 the number of links jumped dramatically to 
389, an increase of almost 65%. After that period, the links decreased again but remained at about 
the same level in Phase 6, as was evident in the crisis of 1997–1998.  
The Jaccard statistics, which compare the networks in a phase to that in the previous phase, 
summarize one aspect of the changing numbers of linkages (Table 4). The first row of Table 4 
indicates the proportion of links that existed in the earlier period which were removed in the 
transition to the next period. The second row indicates the proportion of links which formed 
between the two phases as a proportion of the latest phase’s links. In this way, we can see the 
composition of the elements of the Jaccard statistic listed in the third row of the column. The 
Jaccard statistics are low; that is, relatively few links are common between two phases. This is 
partly because the network is growing significantly in number of links over the sample period, 
with 45% more links in Phase 6 than Phase 1, and this growth results in a reduction in the Jaccard 
statistic by construction. The first two rows show that, in general, the network exhibits greater 
stability, in terms of the retention of edges, as time progresses. Setting aside the post-crisis period 
of Phase 6, it is apparent that the proportion of links lost during each of the sample shifts is falling, 
from 80% to 65%. The edges are becoming more likely to be retained over the sample period. The 
growth of the network is still apparent, however, in that the drop of the number of new links as a 
proportion of the total in each phase remains relatively more stable, at or over 75% of each phase. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Weighted Networks with Regional Groupings 
A. Phase 1 B. Phase 2 C. Phase 3 
   
D. Phase 4 E. Phase 5 F. Phase 6 
   
Notes: Sample period: 1 March 1995 to 30 December 2016. Regions are color-coded as Asia (light green), Europe (magenta), North America (dark green), South America 
(blue), Africa (orange), as defined in Table 1. The figure displays the returns-based network of 42 equity markets. Edges were calculated using bivariate Granger causality 
tests between markets at the 5% level of significance.  Edge thickness is proportional to the intensity of the edge strength. Node color is proportion to the regional grouping 
while the node size is proportion to its degree. 
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Table 4: Jaccard Statistics 
Jaccard Statistic for All Countries in the Sample (%) 
  Phases   
   1–2  2–3  3–4  4–5  5–6 1–3 4–6 
Edges removed as proportion of Phase t-1   80.48 81.97 73.96 64.98 81.23 74.29 68.35 
Edges formed as proportion of Phase t 86.56 74.30 75.95 78.66 76.14 74.77 75.49 
Jaccard statistic for all edges 8.65 11.85 14.47 15.29 11.74 14.59 16.03 
 
The transitions around the global financial crisis period, involving Phase 5, paint a picture 
complementary to the analysis above. During Phase 5 a relatively lower proportion of existing 
links in Phase 4 have been retained, and the many that are formed during the crisis period are 
subsequently not retained in Phase 6. Thus, the crisis period sees an increase in density consistent 
with the high degree of net formation of new links, consistent with the dominance of the Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) form of contagion. 
The result of examining the transition from the build-up in pre-crisis to crisis period is that there 
is a rapid increase in the number of statistically significant edges in the network—supporting the 
idea that during periods of stress the markets become more interconnected. This is consistent with 
the literature finding considerable evidence of contagion4.  
The average link is weaker in the crisis period than the lead-up to crisis period. Panel B of Table 
3 shows how this evolves. The top part of the panel describes the mechanism of formation of edges 
between each of the phases and the bottom section describes the edges removed. A relatively large 
number, on average, of weaker edges were formed (264 edges formed of average strength 0.0194) 
while a smaller number of stronger edges were removed (169 edges removed of average strength 
0.0206). Dungey et al. (2017) observe declines in the average strength of the links between the 
periods leading up to crisis and the crisis periods themselves for CDS markets. 
A similar pattern is observed in the transition between the pre-GFC period and the crisis itself in 
comparing the results for Phases 4 and 5. In this case, there were 306 links formed between Phase 
4 and 5 and 154 links removed. That is, the number of links formed outweighs the number of links 
removed (and note that the total number of links recorded in Phase 5 was 389, so that a full 64% 
                                               
4 In our analysis, sample variances are separately controlled in the different phases, thus the changes in correlation 
are not a symptom of the changing variance. See Forbes and Rigobon (2002).   
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of the links in Phase 4 were removed in Phase 5). The Jaccard statistic for Phase 5 compared with 
Phase 4 is 11.74% (Table 4). In both of these cases slightly fewer links were remove and slightly 
fewer formed than in the adjacent periods otherwise covered in the table. This suggests that in 
periods of stress some links do not thrive, but they return during non-stress periods. Ongoing work 
is examining in detail the corporate characteristics of these markets within countries, but no our 
knowledge none has yet been undertaken on a macro fundamental country basis, although these 
results certainly provide a motivation to do so. 
The new links formed between phase 4  and phase 5 were on average slightly stronger than those 
removed,5 and the completeness statistics for the network increase due to both higher average 
strength of the link and a higher number of links. The net change in the number of edges reported 
is not sufficient to characterize the changing nature of the network. Edges removed are just as 
important as edges formed in understanding the transmission of crises—these are both forms of 
contagion between markets. The complications of using completeness statistics to understand the 
evolution of a network are also revealed—completeness may fall due to increased number of edges 
being outweighed by the fall in their average strength as in the Asian financial crisis example, or 
it may rise due to the overwhelming increase in the number of edges, which is the case for the 
global financial crisis period. Knowing which edges are removed may be critical—for example, 
the collapse of Bear-Stearns in 2007. Policy makers will clearly wish to understand both the 
possibilities for removed edges and formed edges in periods of stress and have alternative plans 
available for each. 
The post-crisis periods in the sample also reveal interesting contrasts. Both periods also include 
crisis periods in other parts of the network—in Phase 3, the dotcom crisis, and in Phase 6, the 
European debt crisis—making it difficult to classify these two periods as clearly post-crisis 
conditions. However, the transitions from the main crises of focus in this analysis are instructive. 
                                               
5 The reason the average strength of links in panel A of Table 3 is lower in Phase 5 than Phase 4, but the formed edges 
between Phases 4 and 5 are stronger than the removed edges in panel B is that they represent slightly different options 
for calculation. Panel A gives the average strength as the sum of the weighted Granger links over the possible links. 
Panel B gives the removed strengths as the sum of the removed links weighted by the t-1 period weights over the 
changed number of links (that is, an incremental Granger matrix) and the formed strengths are given as the sum of the 
weighted links formed, weighted with the current period weights, over the sum of the formed links (that is, an 
incremental Granger matrix). Thus, in panel A the results are only about time t data, whereas panel B involves weights 
from both the previous and current periods. This accounts for the apparent analytical differences.  
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From Phase 2 to Phase 3, the number of links is reduced, as it is from Phase 5 to Phase 6. That is, 
after our main crisis period, the number of edges falls. In the first case, from Phase 2 to Phase 3, 
this is achieved by reducing in the number of links (loss of 250 links and gain of only 159) and a 
lower average strength in the new links than those which are removed. These factors both 
contribute to a lower completeness statistic in Phase 3 than in the previous period. Similarly, in 
the transition from Phase 5 to Phase 6, more links are removed than formed. The links which are 
removed are stronger than those formed, contributing to a lower completeness statistic in Phase 6. 
Identifying which of the links exist prior to a crisis, are lost during the crisis, and then reformed in 
the post-crisis period has policy implications. Were these linkage losses due to deliberate isolation 
of nodes or due to their vulnerability? The first evidence of this is provided in the Jaccard statistics 
for pre-crisis to post-crisis phases (the last two columns of Table 4). The Jaccard tests show that 
there are relatively few of the links in place before the crisis are in place again after the crisis. 
There is clearly some return of the pre-existing links, as the test statistic is larger than those 
between other periods, but overall the evidence suggests that the network does not return to its pre-
existing state in the post-crisis period. This is consistent with the existing literature examining 
single instances of pre and post crisis networks. To address this question more specifically we turn 
to analysis of the links between nodes themselves. 
5.2. Changing Involvement of Nodes Over Time 
As shown in Table 3, not only does the net number of linkages between nodes change between 
subperiods, but this also masks changes in the existence of specific linkages. Table 5 provides 
descriptive statistics of the form of the network in each phase. The first statistics are the degree of 
the network--in-degree is the number of links which directionally point towards each node, out-
degree is the number of links pointing away from each node. 
The average in-degree and out-degree for the network over the entire sample period is given in the 
first panel of Table 5 and shows that the means are identical. However, the median in-degree for 
the network exceeds the median out-degree and has a much lower standard deviation—the range 
of the out-degree for each node is far higher. While for the entire sample every node has an in-
degree of at least 5, meaning that each node receives transmissions from at least 5 other nodes, 
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directly, the maximum in-degree is 18. In contrast, not all nodes transmit shocks (a minimum out-
degree of zero).  
To consider the changing nature of the in-degree and out-degree, Figure 4 provides a bar chart of 
the numbers of nodes with out and in-degree respectively, by 5-degree intervals for each phase. 
The light blue section of each column of Figure 4 is the number of nodes recording 5 or fewer 
edges (including zero) in that phase, with subsequent categories rising in increments of 5. It is 
immediately apparent that in-degree by phase has lower numbers of nodes with fewer connections 
than out-degree by phase. This is marked during the crisis Phases 2 and 5, which have the fewest 
nodes registering low in-degree or out-degree. This means that the nodes which are connected 
during the periods of stress have links to more other nodes than those connected during periods of 
less stress. The in-degree for any node involved in the system is never above 15, indicating that 
each node receives shocks from sources which are specific, and perhaps identifiable, paths. 
However, the out-degree for each phase is more diverse. Table 5 shows that the maximum out-
degree generally rises over the sample, but the figures reveal the extent to which the distribution 
of higher connected nodes increases in times of stress. In Phases 2 and 5 there are discernibly more 
nodes involved with a higher out-degree. That is, they are involved in transmitting shocks to (more) 
other nodes. However, this does not necessarily mean that they are source nodes for the shocks. 
Shocks may transmit between nodes through other nodes. A measure of the extent of this effect is 
the “betweenness” centrality, which effectively assesses the substitutability of a node. This 
measures the number of times a given node acts as part of the shortest path between two other 
nodes. It helps to determine how important a node may be in transmitting information through a 
network. A node with a normalized betweenness centrality measure of one is involved in the 
shortest path between all nodes in the network, and hence its removal could be of substantial 
importance for the network. (This node does not obviously need to be the biggest in the network 
or the source of a shock. Bear-Stearns forms a good example of this type of risk during the global 
financial crisis.) A market with a betweenness measure of zero is unimportant in retaining the 
network.  
Table 5 shows that the average betweenness centrality of the network rises dramatically in Phase 
3 of the sample but, in Phase 5, it drops from the previous pre-crisis sample period. Betweenness 
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clearly differs across the phases, pointing to the different structures of core nodes during the 
different periods, as will be discussed below.  
Eigenvector centrality is also an indicator of proximity between nodes. The eigenvector centrality 
of each market is determined by the eigenvector centralities of the markets to which it is connected. 
That is, eigenvector centrality of country i , 𝑒𝑣𝑖, is given by, 𝑒𝑣𝑖 =
1
𝜆
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗  𝑒𝑣𝑗𝑗 , where λ is a 
constant that provides a nontrivial solution and 𝐴𝑖𝑗  is an adjacency matrix; see Bonacich (1972) 
and Chuluun (2016). In this way eigenvalue centrality is a measure of connectedness in the entire 
market network. Although it has a similar form to the PageRank algorithm used in assessing 
systemic risk in Dungey et al. (2013) and van de Leur et al. (2017), because eigenvalue centrality 
is based on eigenvalues which do not vary much between phases, the eigenvalue centrality measure 
does not move between the phases. This points to the importance of understanding the measures 
which are being used; the relatively unchanging eigenvalues is consistent with  
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Various Network Measures (All Countries) 
  All Phases (01.03.1995–30.12.2016) 
  Mean Med Std. Dev Min Max 
In-Degree 11.52 11.00 3.27 5.00 18.00 
Out-Degree 11.52 8.00 9.18 0.00 37.00 
Betweenness Centrality 21.00 12.84 21.18 1.32 90.41 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 
  Phase 1 (01.03.1995–01.07.1997) 
In-Degree 5.00 5.00 2.55 0.00 10.00 
Out-Degree 5.00 4.00 3.85 1.00 22.00 
Betweenness Centrality 36.71 22.88 43.35 3.78 227.12 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 
  Phase 2 (02.07.1997–31.12.1998) 
In-Degree 7.26 7.00 3.19 0.00 14.00 
Out-Degree 7.26 6.00 5.52 0.00 22.00 
Betweenness Centrality 28.48 19.59 27.28 1.90 105.77 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 
  Phase 3 (01.01.1999–31.12.2002) 
In-Degree 5.10 5.00 2.18 1.00 10.00 
Out-Degree 5.10 4.00 5.28 0.00 28.00 
Betweenness Centrality 36.19 17.42 53.48 0.00 307.61 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 
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  Phase 4 (01.01.2003–14.09.2008) 
In-Degree 5.64 6.00 2.43 0.00 12.00 
Out-Degree 5.64 4.00 5.91 0.00 31.00 
Betweenness Centrality 33.43 21.29 43.67 0.00 263.65 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 
  Phase 5 (15.09.2008–31.03.2010) 
In-Degree 9.26 9.00 2.96 1.00 15.00 
Out-Degree 9.26 5.50 9.49 0.00 35.00 
Betweenness Centrality 24.71 10.56 38.47 0.52 196.03 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 
  Phase 6 (01.04.2010–30.12.2016) 
In-Degree 7.29 7.00 2.99 0.00 13.00 
Out-Degree 7.29 5.00 7.40 0.00 34.00 
Betweenness Centrality 28.14 14.52 43.21 0.00 211.56 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 
Note: We use the network measures of in-degree, out-degree, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality to 
capture the centrality of a country's position in the global financial network and its closeness to all other countries in 
these networks.   
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Figure 4: Figures for In-Degree and Out-Degree by Phases 
 
 
Note: See Table 2 for the phases and their corresponding time periods. 
 
Pesaran and Yang (2016) who find that the wholesale trade sector is the dominant economic sector 
over multiple samples in a real economy network. (Unlike in their form, there is no individual 
node with an eigenvalue of greater than 0.5 in our sample that can be considered statistically 
dominant.) There is little information content in the eigenvalue centrality measure for assessing 
the changing nature of a network of nodes in financial markets over time. Table 6 provides the 
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and eigenvalue centrality figures for each individual 
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node assessed over the entire sample. It is evident that there is no great variation in the closeness 
and eigenvalue centrality measures across different countries. In contrast Wang et al. (2018) derive 
a variety of centrality and closeness measures for 57 international equity markets and observe 
patterns consistent with crisis periods, although the range of their statistics does not vary greatly 
over time. 
Thus far we have established that: (i) the number of connections between nodes changes between 
phases, (ii) that some edges are removed from the system while (iii) some edges are formed each 
time, (iv) that the connectedness of nodes as measured by in-degree and out-degree changes in 
what appears to be a discernible way, increasing during periods of stress, (v) the nodes which are 
more or less involved in the network during various phases may change, and that (vi) measures of 
centrality do not provide definitive information about changing financial networks during periods 
of stress. This information is gleaned from the summary measures of the network for each phase. 
We turn now to examining individual nodes. 
5.3. Spreaders and Absorbers 
We are particularly interested in identifying four types of nodes, and whether different nodes 
change their role during periods of stress and calm. The four types of nodes are: super-spreaders, 
super-absorbers, periphery-spreaders, and periphery-absorbers. Super-spreaders are those markets 
which absorb shocks and distribute them to many other nodes; generally, they will have a 
substantially higher out-degree than in-degree. Super-absorbers are markets which are subject to 
many shocks but do not distribute them widely; generally, they will have a substantially lower out-
degree than in-degree. A greater discrepancy between the in-degree and the out-degree of each 
node places it more firmly into the super-spreader or super-absorber category. Periphery-spreaders 
originate shocks to many markets but do not receive a great deal of in-links. They can be viewed 
as a specific form of the super-spreaders, the key difference being that the in-degree is relatively 
small. Periphery-absorbers are markets which absorb shocks but do not pass them on; they are a 
specific form of super-absorbers where the key is the very low out-degree.
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Table 6: Network Statistics for the Whole Sample 
Vertex/Country In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness Centrality Eigenvector Centrality 
Argentina 7 4 6.5658 0.0113 
Australia 18 13 24.3210 0.0309 
Austria 14 13 32.6658 0.0261 
Belgium 11 7 9.6903 0.0189 
Brazil 11 19 36.7235 0.0318 
Canada 11 24 52.5183 0.0360 
Chile 12 6 9.7601 0.0211 
China 6 16 12.7719 0.0204 
Czech Republic 15 10 20.6217 0.0252 
Denmark 9 6 4.4163 0.0197 
Egypt 9 7 6.6775 0.0174 
Finland 12 7 8.1179 0.0217 
France 10 19 53.7337 0.0275 
Germany 11 9 8.4845 0.0213 
Greece 7 18 21.7494 0.0239 
Hong Kong 17 8 18.1500 0.0259 
Hungary 12 9 15.3452 0.0235 
India 11 6 9.2375 0.0195 
Indonesia 15 28 56.8902 0.0381 
Ireland 10 29 58.3729 0.0352 
Italy 9 9 11.1405 0.0217 
Japan 13 29 50.0405 0.0344 
Malaysia 15 6 14.3542 0.0235 
Mexico 5 37 76.6419 0.0406 
Netherlands 10 7 1.3214 0.0158 
New Zealand 9 6 9.0325 0.0185 
Pakistan 6 5 4.4446 0.0108 
Philippines 10 2 1.8190 0.0163 
Poland 15 4 8.2548 0.0228 
Portugal 13 1 2.4349 0.0176 
Singapore 13 8 12.9077 0.0222 
South Africa 14 7 17.6159 0.0235 
Republic of Korea 18 9 15.7321 0.0271 
Spain 13 7 11.3760 0.0221 
Sri Lanka 6 0 1.8586 0.0068 
Sweden 9 4 2.8124 0.0177 
Switzerland 14 5 10.1012 0.0210 
Taiwana 13 13 19.8328 0.0260 
Thailand 16 12 25.2410 0.0279 
Turkey 11 7 10.1564 0.0208 
United Kingdom 14 11 17.6546 0.0281 
United States 10 37 90.4137 0.0398 
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Table 7: Characteristics of a Return Based Network  
  
All Phases Phase 1  Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
Vertex 
OUT IN OUT IN OUT IN OUT IN OUT IN OUT IN OUT IN 
Argentina 4 7 2 9 18 5 4 4 5 3 35 12 0 3 
Australia 13 18 4 4 4 7 4 7 5 9 1 14 7 13 
Austria 13 14 3 5 5 10 7 6 11 4 12 9 8 8 
Belgium 7 11 6 9 6 3 1 5 7 6 17 12 0 7 
Brazil 19 11 3 10 6 9 4 8 8 5 12 14 14 0 
Canada 24 11 6 4 12 5 16 6 11 1 1 15 9 10 
Chile 6 12 11 7 9 7 11 6 2 3 2 10 8 7 
China 16 6 1 4 4 3 1 2 0 3 8 8 23 4 
Czech Republic 10 15 4 1 9 11 4 9 3 6 7 9 9 10 
Denmark 6 9 10 6 10 9 6 4 10 9 4 9 3 6 
Egypt 7 9 7 0 3 6 2 5 0 5 10 7 9 6 
Finland 7 12 6 2 2 9 5 10 1 4 5 10 13 11 
France 19 10 5 6 1 10 3 5 4 7 33 9 1 5 
Germany 9 11 4 5 15 14 3 2 8 4 11 5 13 5 
Greece 18 7 4 4 7 1 1 4 3 6 6 7 11 10 
Hong Kong 8 17 7 9 11 9 1 8 7 6 3 15 3 13 
Hungary 9 12 7 5 3 13 1 5 1 7 8 10 1 5 
India 6 11 3 3 0 5 0 3 5 6 4 8 10 6 
Indonesia 28 15 3 7 13 6 4 5 2 4 27 9 5 11 
Ireland 29 10 1 4 22 10 7 4 2 5 15 7 2 10 
Italy 9 9 4 9 1 5 3 5 5 7 17 8 1 5 
Japan 29 13 6 1 15 6 15 4 6 7 5 12 12 5 
Malaysia 6 15 2 6 6 10 4 3 2 7 18 8 7 11 
Mexico 37 5 7 5 10 8 14 4 17 0 22 8 4 5 
Netherlands 7 10 4 6 0 7 4 8 16 5 0 11 23 9 
New Zealand 6 9 4 4 4 8 1 5 3 10 1 4 0 5 
Pakistan 5 6 1 3 13 3 3 4 0 3 2 1 1 5 
Philippines 2 10 3 3 4 6 0 4 10 5 0 12 2 10 
Poland 4 15 1 5 1 12 2 10 5 6 0 6 4 9 
Portugal 1 13 3 6 7 6 7 8 1 5 22 8 4 6 
Singapore 8 13 4 4 7 4 4 3 1 12 6 9 1 8 
South Africa 7 14 3 5 4 12 5 8 2 7 5 8 3 8 
Republic of Korea 9 18 2 4 6 4 4 7 2 11 2 14 21 11 
Spain 7 13 9 7 5 7 4 5 3 6 9 11 3 5 
Sri Lanka 0 6 8 0 7 0 1 2 0 4 3 8 1 2 
Sweden 4 9 1 9 5 12 2 4 4 4 2 8 6 8 
Switzerland 5 14 12 8 1 6 2 3 5 7 3 7 5 10 
Taiwan 13 13 3 1 5 4 11 1 10 6 4 10 8 7 
Thailand 12 16 3 5 2 9 5 6 1 3 2 12 14 7 
Turkey 7 11 3 3 6 7 4 5 4 8 2 5 2 4 
United Kingdom 11 14 8 7 20 8 6 3 14 7 11 11 1 11 
United States 37 10 22 5 16 9 28 4 31 4 32 9 34 5 
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The most obvious super-spreader in the sample is the US (Table 7). It routinely has more out-
degrees than in-degrees. The central role of the US in global financial markets is well-documented, 
and here our evidence seems to strongly support the center and periphery argument of Kaminsky, 
Reinhart, and Vegh (2003), where developed financial markets act as a conduit for the transmission 
of shocks from other periphery markets.  
The in-degree and out-degree measures for individual markets are recorded in Table 7. The first 
two columns present the out-degree and in-degree of each of the nodes for the entire sample of the 
network. It is evident that the greatest number of out-degrees is recorded for the US, consistent 
with our designation of a super-spreader. The fewest links are recorded by Sri Lanka, which, we 
noted previously, is an isolated node. The maximum in-degree is received by the Republic of 
Korea, while the minimum in-degree is recorded by Mexico. 
To summarize the role of the super-spreaders, super-absorbers, and peripheral spreaders and 
peripheral absorbers Table 8 provides a breakdown of the markets identified in the sample. To 
construct this table, we used the following selection rules applied to each market: 
 Define: x = (out-degree − in-degree) 
  
The cut-off points for differentiating these types of absorbers have been chosen on an ad-hoc basis 
in this table, based on visual analysis by the authors. Further work to examine the sensitivity and 
explanatory power of different variables to alternative definitions is warranted in future work.  
Table 8 makes evident that over the different samples, the number of spreaders and absorbers 
increases—which simply represents the more connected network. Two countries particularly stand 
out as ones that swap roles between periods of stress and non-stress. Both Argentina and Ireland 
 x<0 x>0 
Out-degree < 3 Peripheral-absorber  
In-degree <3  Peripheral-spreader 
Absolute (x) >6 Super-absorber Super-spreader 
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are super-spreaders in the crisis periods of Phases 2 and 5 but revert to being super-absorbers 
during other periods. The constant presence of the US as a super-spreader is accompanied by 
Japan, which is a spreader (either super or peripheral) in each period except Phase 4. (Recall that 
Phase 4 represents the early part of the 21st century when the Japanese economy was not 
synchronized with other OECD or global economies—Farrell et al. (2005) note a diminishing role 
for Japanese markets in this period). Distinct roles for several European markets emerge in the 
later parts of the sample; particularly post Phase 3 after the formal introduction of the euro area. 
France and Italy are each super-spreaders during the global financial crisis, but not during the 
surrounding phases, while Germany emerges as a super-spreader in both post-crisis periods of 
Phases 3 and 4. The perhaps unexpectedly different roles of the German and French markets are 
consistent with results in Wang et al. (2018), who attribute the centrality of the French markets 
within Europe as due to the presence of the World Federation of Exchanges in Paris.6  
Rather than being isolated or negligible (as in the analysis of Farrell et al., 2005), the Asian region 
markets are clearly identifiable as a presence in the network. While Japan is evident throughout, 
Asian markets are more generally identified as spreaders or absorbers from Phase 3 onward—that 
is, in the post-Asian crisis period. The emergence of Hong Kong and Singapore as super-absorbers 
is particularly important (Hong Kong from Phase 3 onward, and Singapore in Phases 3 and 6). 
New Zealand also emerges as an absorber in this period. Interestingly, these are all some of the 
most developed markets in the region, although the New Zealand market is small by global 
standards. This role of super-absorber is evident as they form bridges between the numerous in-
linkages from Asian economies and fewer out-linkages transporting the effects to the global 
markets.  
The analysis of the changing in and out-degree of the network considers that not only are the 
numbers of links in the network changing, but also that the nodes that are most connected change. 
The next stage in this research agenda is to explore whether these changes in out-degree and in-
degree can be systematically related to characteristics of the markets involved.
                                               
6 If this hypothesis is correct, then there are significant gains to a market from co-location with an international 
organizational body.  
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Table 8: Spreaders and Absorbers by Phase 
  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
Vertex S A S A S A S A S A S A 
Argentina  SA SS      SS   PA 
Australia          SA   
Austria             
Belgium      PA      SA 
Brazil           SS  
Canada     SS     SA   
Chile        PA  PA   
China  PA    PA     SS  
Czech Republic PS            
Denmark             
Egypt SS     PA  PA     
Finland PS   SA    PA     
France         SS   PA 
Germany     SS      SS  
Greece      PA       
Hong Kong      SA    SA  SA 
Hungary    SA  PA  PA    PA 
India      PA       
Indonesia   SS     PA SS    
Ireland  PA SS     PA SS   SA 
Italy         SS   PA 
Japan PS  SS  SS   PA   SS  
Malaysia  PA       SS    
Mexico         SS    
Netherlands          SA  PA 
New Zealand        SA  PA   
Pakistan  PA SS     PA PS   PA 
Philippines          SA  SA 
Poland  PA        PA   
Portugal        PA SS    
Singapore        SA    SA 
South Africa        PA     
Republic of Korea  PA      SA  SA SS  
Spain             
Sri Lanka SS  SS   PA  PA     
Sweden  SA  SA  PA       
Switzerland    PA  PA       
Taiwan     SS     SA   
Thailand    SA    PA   SS  
Turkey          PA  PA 
United Kingdom   SS        SS  
United States SS  SS  SS    SS  SS  
Note: SS = Super-spreader, PS = Periphery-spreader, SA = Super-absorber, PA = Periphery Absorber. .
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5.4. Focus on the Asia-Pacific Region 
Figure 5 (Panels A to F) illustrates the sub-network within the Asia-Pacific region with a few key 
non-regional source shocks included (notably the US, UK). That is, we have cut down the 
information in Figure 1 to make this analytically more tractable. The system statistics are given in 
Table 9 for each Phase, where we treat each ‘region’ as a single node in counting the in-degree 
and out-degree.  
It is readily apparent from Figure 5 that the United States has the greatest number of connections 
of each of the nodes considered (omitting all the European links from the diagram provides this 
clarity), and that Sri Lanka and Pakistan are relatively isolated. The dominant direction is an out-
link from the US to the other markets. We proceed to the sub-sample analyses to understand more 
clearly the changing nature of the network within the Asia-Pacific. 
Figure 5, Panel A, reveals the network for the Phase One, prior to the Asian crisis. Here it is 
apparent that the network is quite sparse. The links from the United States directly to the Asian 
markets are dominated by the direct link to Hong Kong. This provides an evidently important 
conduit from Hong Kong to and from other Asian markets – Hong Kong has links to each of 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Australia. There are also direct links from the US to Singapore, 
which again provides a conduit on to other Asian markets which are not as strongly connected, 
such as China and Australia. Thus, both Hong Kong and Singapore are providing a bridge node 
for transmissions to other Asian markets. Even more evident is the role of the UK and Australia in 
receiving links from the US and distributing them into Asia. The Australian node transmits 
between Indonesia and Hong Kong, while there is a clear expression of links from the UK into 
Asia-Pacific markets; evident for New Zealand, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines. A particularly interesting facet of the network in this Phase is that Japan is connected 
to the US, but does not provide a bridge for these shocks into Asian markets. 
By Phase Two (the Asian crisis) the links from the US directly to the Asian-Pacific markets are 
evident for a wider range of markets than in the previous Phase. The link between the US and UK 
remains strong, with ongoing links to other markets, but during this crisis period, while the links 
to Australia and New Zealand from the US are strong, the onwards projection of shocks from these 
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sources to other Asian markets is not as pronounced as in Phase One. However, the network does 
not indicate that shocks emerging from the Asian markets travel directly to the US, in this case 
they tend to transmit around the Asian market and then to developed markets via the conduit of 
regional hubs such as Hong Kong. (For example, consider a shock originating in Malaysia – one 
route for this to affect the developed markets of US, UK, New Zealand or Australia is via the link 
from Malaysia to Hong Kong and hence to the developed markets.)  
Panel C of Figure 5 shows the much-reduced network in the post-crisis period. Compared with the 
pre-crisis period of Phase One, more of the Asian markets are directly linked to the US. The role 
of the UK in providing a further conduit into Asian markets is also evident. Japan is now more 
integrated into the network; it is receiving shocks from all of the developed markets (bar New 
Zealand) directly and passing them on to Hong Kong and Indonesia directly. China is still 
relatively isolated, in that it receives effects from the rest of the network only through the UK. Sri 
Lanka is a completely isolated node. 
In the build-up to the Global Financial Crisis, in Phase Four, the network is much denser than in 
previous periods. In Panel D, the links directly from Asian markets to the more developed markets 
are becoming clear - for example Taiwan and Malaysia. Importantly, China is now connecting via 
an Asian bridge - the Hong Kong market, as well as directly to the UK node. The role of Japan as 
a means of transmitting shocks continues to grow, whilst it still receives shocks quite strongly 
from the other developed markets - and distributes them via Hong Kong and Singapore - there are 
also more direct links from Malaysia, to Thailand and to South Korea. 
The increasing density of the Asia-Pacific network continues in the Global Financial Crisis period, 
Phase Five, as shown in Panel E. China in this case becomes a source of inputs to the network but 
is not linked directly to the shocks emanating from the US, evidence of the differences in outcomes 
for China and Western developed markets during this period. The role of Japan, on the other hand, 
continues to become more important as a bridge to Asian region markets. In contrast, the role of 
Hong Kong now shows primarily inward linkages from the Asian markets (it remains connected 
in both directions to many markets but compared with earlier Phases there is a higher degree of 
inward linkages) and then acting as a bridge to markets such as the US and UK. Hong Kong 
remains an important bridge market between the Asian markets and others. Singapore has a similar 
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experience. As with the existing analyses of changing networks during the Global Financial Crisis 
the completeness of the network in the Global Financial Crisis increased dramatically (see Billio 
et al. (2012) and Merton et al. (2013)). 
In Phase Six, Panel F, the density of the network decreases from the crisis period but the greater 
connectivity of the Asian markets from many sources remains prevalent; for example, South Korea 
is now receiving links from a much wider portion of the network than previously. China is clearly 
more connected than it has been previously, there are links outward from China to many of the 
Asian markets - Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, and Singapore – but it still only 
receives inward links from Australia and the US. Japan and Hong Kong are evident in their 
functioning as hubs for receiving and distributing shocks with Asian markets. 
Table 9: Summary statistics of various network measures for ASIA plus US and 
UK 
  All Phases  
  Mean Med Std. Dev Min Max 
In-Degree 5.65 6.00 1.92 1.00 9.00 
Out-Degree 5.65 5.00 4.21 1.00 16.00 
Betweenness Centrality 6.94 3.95 14.67 0.00 39.94 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.09 
  Phase 1  
In-Degree 2.18 2.00 1.70 0.00 5.00 
Out-Degree 2.18 1.00 2.72 0.00 10.00 
Betweenness Centrality 15.53 3.00 22.07 0.00 69.89 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.13 
  Phase 2 
In-Degree 2.47 2.00 1.55 0.00 6.00 
Out-Degree 2.47 2.00 2.65 0.00 11.00 
Betweenness Centrality 13.65 3.00 32.23 0.00 134.33 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.14 
  Phase 3 
In-Degree 2.06 2.00 1.14 0.00 4.00 
Out-Degree 2.06 1.00 3.31 0.00 13.00 
Betweenness Centrality 12.12 1.33 29.07 0.00 119.00 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.15 
  Phase 4 
In-Degree 3.35 2.00 3.39 0.00 13.00 
Out-Degree 3.35 3.00 1.80 0.00 7.00 
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Betweenness Centrality 8.24 3.43 9.97 0.00 33.79 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.11 
  Phase 5  
In-Degree 4.35 4.00 2.06 0.00 7.00 
Out-Degree 4.35 3.00 3.71 0.00 15.00 
Betweenness Centrality 6.47 4.75 9.03 0.00 39.02 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.10 
  Phase 6  
In-Degree 4.06 4.00 1.92 2.00 8.00 
Out-Degree 4.06 3.00 4.21 0.00 16.00 
Betweenness Centrality 8.47 2.94 14.67 0.00 60.59 
Eigenvector Centrality 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.10 
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Figure 5: Evolution of Weighted Networks with Asian markets, US and UK 
A. Phase 1 B. Phase 2 C. Phase 3 
   
D. Phase 4 E. Phase 5 F. Phase 6 
   
Notes: The figure displays the returns-based network of 42 equity markets from 1 March 1995 to 30 December 2016. Edges were calculated using bivariate Granger 
causality tests between markets at the 5% level of significance. The thickness of the lines indicates the average relative strength of each market (or regional 
grouping). The size of the nodes increases with the number of inward and outward links of each respective market (or regional grouping). Regional groupings are 
defined in Table 1.
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5.5. Role of ASEAN7 Markets 
Figure 6 presents the network between the Asia and Pacific markets with the ASEAN markets 
aggregated to a single block to examine the evolution of the network between both ASEAN and 
the rest of the Asian block, as well as the rest of the world.  
Figure 6 shows the importance of the link between Hong Kong and the ASEAN markets over the 
whole period—each of the phase diagrams show that this link remains prominent throughout the 
subsamples. These links primarily run from ASEAN markets to Hong Kong—as previously 
covered this reflects the role of Hong Kong (and Singapore, which is included in the ASEAN 
sample) in connecting Asian markets to the rest of the world.  
Across the differing phases, there is a transformation of the structure of the network involving 
ASEAN and Asian markets, which seems to reflect the increasing development and deepening of 
the markets dominating the effects of crisis and non-crisis periods. Early in the sample, in Phase 
1, there are noticeably fewer links to ASEAN economies than later in the sample—the links are 
mainly from or to developed markets rather than other developing Asian markets. Notably, Japan 
is not connected directly to ASEAN in this period. During Phase 2, there is a distinct change, in 
that inward links to ASEAN from other Asian markets begin to appear, from China and the 
Republic of Korea. Japan remains directly unconnected.  
In Phase 3, post-Asian financial crisis, the US is clearly central to the distribution around the 
network. The links from other markets continue to develop, with Japan, Pakistan, and Taiwan 
connecting, although the Republic of Korea has dropped the association it had during the crisis 
period of Phase 2. China is also connecting to the network through its non-Asian connections but 
has the role of an end node in this network, a position also occupied by Sri Lanka.  
In the build-up to the global financial crisis during Phase 4, the network shows the ASEAN markets 
having stronger links than previously, with a similar group of markets as the previous phase. The 
Indian market, which was previously not directly linked with ASEAN markets, is now present; 
Pakistan remains relatively isolated. 
                                               
7 In this empirical exercise, ASEAN markets are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, i.e. ASEAN4 
markets. 
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Figure 6 : Evolution of Weighted Networks with Regional Groupings Highlighting ASEAN and Asian Markets 
A. Phase 1 B. Phase 2 C. Phase 3 
   
D. Phase 4 E. Phase 5 F. Phase 6 
   
ASEAN4 = Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand). 
Notes: The figure displays the returns-based network of 42 equity markets from 1 March 1995 to 30 December 2016. Edges were calculated using 
bivariate Granger causality tests between markets at the 5% level of significance. The thickness of the lines indicates the average relative strength 
of each market (or regional grouping). The size of the nodes increases with the number of inward and outward links of each respective market (or 
regional grouping). Regional groupings are defined in Table 1. 
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During the global financial crisis itself, Phase 5, the network is dramatically different from the 
previous phase. Having subsumed the density of links between European, North American, and 
Latin American8 markets into regional nodes, it is apparent that during this period there is an 
important role for the transmission of shocks from the North American markets to ASEAN through 
Japan, less so from Australia than previously, and not at all from New Zealand. The critical paths 
from the rest of the world to Asian markets have changed so that Japan has a gatekeeper role that 
was not evident previously. China is now more evidently directly and strongly linked to ASEAN 
markets and North America, so there are both direct and indirect links between Asian and Chinese 
markets. 
In the final phase, China has continued to increase the number of evident direct links to other nodes 
in the network, and ASEAN markets are clearly an important hub in terms of the number of 
linkages coming in to the ASEAN node. There are also substantial numbers of weaker links from 
ASEAN to other Asian markets, such as Australia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea. Note in this final network, ASEAN markets transition into becoming more integrated into 
the international network in a markedly different way from Phase 1 and the subsequent two phases. 
During the global financial crisis, it appears that the Asian markets matured to become more clearly 
interconnected with other major regions, both through the hubs of ASEAN, Hong Kong and 
Singapore; and more directly by links to major regions outside.  
The conclusion of this analysis is that ASEAN markets are part of the bridge between the market 
regions of Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Consequently, there is a role here for ASEAN markets 
as a core for systemic risk in the Asian region, and many links are filtered through ASEAN and 
Hong Kong markets. Other markets are less clearly hubs for connections with the rest of the world; 
however, this has changed over the last phases as Asian markets have become more completely 
connected to other regions of world markets. 
 
 
 
                                               
8 The Latin American sample includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. See Table 1 for more on the regional 
groupings.   
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6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the results, additional analysis of the evolution of network connections for each 
individual country, and the observations from Raddant and Kenett (2016), we look at policy 
options at both a regional and country level. 
6.1. Regional Level 
 
i. Supporting regional development: A clear feature which differentiates our analysis 
from others is the far greater scale of Asian markets included. Although other studies 
find that Asian markets are relatively isolated in their networks, we find evidence of 
distinct regional groupings, particularly around the ASEAN markets and the bridge 
market of Hong Kong. Our narrative of the more peripheral markets supports the idea 
that in the early stages of the network many of these markets first connected to the rest 
of the world through the bridge of the regional cooperation organizations, such as 
ASEAN, which may have provided a filter for informing the rest of the world about the 
developments in these markets.  
 
Bridge markets can provide a way in which second degree links are available to 
relatively unconnected nodes—for example, in Phase 1, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
connect to the US and Germany through Hong Kong. Support is provided by 
overcoming information asymmetries between the international markets and the 
domestic market. Over time, a number of markets have followed this pattern and gone 
on to form their own significant direct links with the rest of the world markets and are 
no longer primarily connecting through ASEAN, such as Indonesia and Taiwan. This 
points to a potentially important role for cooperation in regions to support developing 
markets, helping lift the participation of millions of citizens into access to international 
finance and thus growth opportunities.  
ii. Regional level protection: Regional fostering of this nature also has advantages in 
providing a level of protection for these markets during periods of crisis. If there is a 
bridge market that is critical in connecting a region to international markets, then it is 
much easier to sever that one link or a limited number of links and protect a large part 
of the regional system than if all components are individually linked. Most likely this 
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relates to the stage of development of the market, because as markets reach a greater 
stage of maturity and form more direct relationships with the rest of the global markets, 
they will increasingly need to have more sophisticated regulatory oversight and tools. 
iii. Concentration of market power: A disadvantage of encouraging a regional approach 
to development may be the concentration of market power in the bridge market. 
Although this is a possibility, as there are clear advantages to the bridge market in 
mediating between asymmetric information situations (where the rest of the world is 
less informed about the developing market) as markets develop, this should be naturally 
eroded by the incentives to develop direct relationships to avoid these costs.  
6.2. Individual Country Level 
Individual countries face several options in accessing international financial markets to foster 
growth, while still being wary of protecting themselves during periods of stress.  
i. Align with a regional bridge node (or nodes). Recommended for markets in early stages 
of development, this strategy allows a market to connect with the international financial 
markets supported by a known node which can mediate the information asymmetry 
between the developing node and the international market. The advantage of this approach 
for the developing market is that it reduces the initial costs of overcoming the information 
asymmetry—only one node needs to be educated about the developing node to access their 
connections to the rest of the world. One such strategy could be to attach to a super-spreader 
node. Choosing the node with which to establish such a relationship is not trivial. In the 
data, a couple of strategies are evident. One is to form regional groupings to act as bridges, 
such as ASEAN markets. This clearly has advantages in terms of regional cooperation and 
potentially better understanding and alignment of the information asymmetries; and could 
be seen as typified by the actions of markets such as the Republic of Korea in the dataset. 
ii. Form a bridge with a dominant super-spreader market directly. This type of relationship 
is typified by the two fastest-growing large economies, India and China. India developed 
relationships with the international network initially through its relationships with the UK 
(reflecting historical associations). China has tended to foster its connections outside the 
Asian region as a matter of priority prior to building the relationships with the Asian nodes. 
An observation from the data is that this seems to be a relatively slower way in which to 
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integrate with the world network directly—although slower integration may itself also be 
a policy choice.  
iii. Playing the role of a bridge: A market may have the opportunity to play the role of a bridge 
between developing nodes and the rest of the global network. This has advantages in that 
there are premia to be made from exploiting the information asymmetry between the global 
markets and the more isolated node. It will contribute to the global importance of the bridge 
market in the network, presumably increasing turnover and influence. The disadvantage 
seems to be that if the node itself is involved in a crisis, a consequent loss of trust may be 
very damaging to the future formation of such relationships. A key illustration of this seems 
to be in the reduction in connectedness of the Hong Kong market as a bridge after the Hong 
Kong crisis in 1998.  
iv. Avoid becoming a bridge: Some markets may also choose not to engage in the risk of 
acting as a bridge node, but to wait until other market nodes are more fully engaged with 
the entirety of the network before establishing links. This seems to be the nature of the 
relationship between Japan and the other Asian markets. Such an approach protects a node 
from the possibility that it may become a conduit for the transmission of crises originating 
in emerging markets to the rest of the world, and subsequently inflict loss on its local 
economic agents. 
v. Isolating markets: An advantage of aligning with a bridge node is that during periods of 
stress it is simpler to cut off these bridge relationships to protect the domestic market. The 
greater the degree of relationships between a market and other world markets the more 
difficult it is to isolate during periods of stress. There are costs and benefits from being 
able to isolate the market node. A case in point is the Malaysian experience, where, pre-
Asian financial crisis, the degree of connectedness for Malaysia was relatively high for an 
Asian market at that time. However, the actions to protect Malaysia during the Asian crisis 
seemed to result in considerable contraction in its connectedness with the rest of the world 
markets for several more phases (particularly until these restrictions were lifted and 
relationships re-established). It may be damaging to ongoing relationships to disconnect 
during periods of stress—although it is hard to quantify the relative costs and benefits of 
these actions.  
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Informing these choices, we observe the following characteristics of the behavior of markets 
within the network during periods of crisis, both originating elsewhere and in their home 
environment. The perceived probability of undergoing either a homegrown policy or political crisis 
are critical inputs in how a market chooses to engage with the rest of the network, and what choices 
are offered by the existing nodes on how it may engage (that is, which markets may be willing or 
not willing to engage as bridge markets for a developing node).  
vi. Growing despite crisis: If a node is not itself directly involved in a crisis, a market may 
simply continue to grow its network steadily, despite chaos surrounding it. In this way, 
being off to the side of the network can result in being protected, and in fact may allow a 
market to benefit from others’ difficulties in establishing direct linkages, as in Taiwan and 
Republic of Korea during the global financial crisis.  
vii. Weathering a home-grown crisis: Just as crises come in many forms, the outcomes 
following the responses to crises seem to come in different forms for the nodes involved. 
For example, in the case of Thailand, which was relatively well-connected for an Asian 
market pre-Asian financial crisis, the subsequent period was characterized by a contraction 
in its network relationships, which took time to rebuild. On the other hand, the Republic of 
Korea—which arguably was not an instigator of the crisis in 1998 but was a victim of the 
various forms of contagion which affected it at the time—was forced into significant 
market liberalization by the terms of the International Monetary Fund programs it was 
involved in, and has continuously grown its integration into world markets ever since. This 
is clearly not a predetermined path, however, as Indonesia had a very different experience 
(probably mitigated by point vi). 
viii. The role of domestic political stress: Part of the reason for information asymmetry 
and uncertainty can revolve around political or civil stress in an economy. This is evident 
for Sri Lanka and Thailand. The timing of political unrest coincides with a reduced rate of 
formation of relationships between these nodes and the rest of the markets. Forming 
international financial connections may not be a resource priority during these periods, 
while the investment risk may also simply be too high for international investors.  
The overall aim of economic policy making bodies is to increase the welfare of citizens. While we 
generally assume that greater integration into international financial markets will help to achieve 
this, it does expose the domestic economy to financial crises originating elsewhere. The choice to 
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seek either a relationship with a bridge node, or indeed to become a bridge node, is one that can 
be mutually beneficial, but the data suggests it is not clearly so. Some markets have chosen this 
route while others have chosen only to connect only after sufficient development of either their 
own markets or other nodes, thereby initially avoiding regional bridges. The variables which 
influence this choice seem likely to be related to: risk aversion of the individual markets, stage of 
development, current rate of economic growth, appetite for capital, economic size and perhaps 
political uncertainty. Casual analysis suggests that (relatively) small emerging markets with lower 
than potential rates of growth and unmet capital needs will benefit from forming an alliance with 
a regional bridge as a conduit to greater capital integration. Those which choose to take on the role 
of bridge markets benefit from the opportunity for increased growth and exploitation of the 
information asymmetry. Economic geography implies that for many that the ability to exploit 
information asymmetry is likely to lie within regions. And the formation of bridge nodes through 
a group of markets, such as ASEAN markets, seems a reasonable means of  groups of nodes 
sharing the risk of crises originating from the developing markets. A formal theoretical model of 
these relationships, and the determining factors for the emergence of the alternative paths evident 
in the data is scope for ongoing work. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Network diagrams improve the transparency of financial inter-relationships and provide a more 
compelling picture of the complexity of these relationships than simple tables of correlation 
analysis ever can. The weighted networks filter for non-statistically significant connections, 
meaning that the potentially spuriously large connections are omitted from the weighted network.  
The evolution of the financial network between the 42 countries examined here clearly indicates 
the growing internationalization and interconnectedness of Asian markets. We highlight instances 
where this has occurred through the interaction of markets with local or regional core or gatekeeper 
nodes, particularly Hong Kong, Singapore, and the ASEAN economies. Over time the linkages 
between Asian markets and other major regions have become increasingly direct. We hypothesize 
that the support (or existence) of geographically localized hubs or centers help establish the role 
of an emerging market within the global markets. On the other hand, there is also evidence of large 
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markets, such as India, emerging to become more interconnected with global markets without 
significant use of a geographically based hub—in the Indian case this may be a consequence of 
strong historical links to British institutional structures.  
The contribution of the gateway or core markets within a region to the development of emerging 
markets is a strong argument against plans to reduce complexity and increase the randomness of 
financial networks. Doing so may have detrimental effects on the development and deepening of 
emerging markets, which appear to “grow” into maturity by establishing their own direct links 
with non-regional markets through the legitimacy of first connecting via regional hubs. This is 
critical for regions with significant untapped financial deepening and may limit opportunities for 
emerging markets. A core of markets to support regional financial development may be aided by 
the formal economic cooperation of strategic players. For example, the results show that while 
Singapore and Hong Kong played important roles as gatekeepers for many Asian markets, when 
the ASEAN economies are aggregated, their developing role in the world financial markets, and 
as a gatekeeper group of markets, is clear.  
Considering the role of core groups in a region in assisting the development of emerging members 
is a strong policy recommendation when developing interventions to protect (or even form) 
regional cores, and for policy actions to inoculate those cores during crisis periods, thus protecting 
a substantial part of the network. Akin to arguments surrounding the vulnerability of economies 
undergoing a transition from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes to currency crises, the period 
of developing financial market deepening in other financial assets may also be accompanied by 
vulnerabilities that require extra vigilance on the part not only of the individual economies 
involved, but also on the regional and international financial community. We have shown that 
examining net links, and changes in net links, omits valuable information about the sustainability 
of individual links and the changing importance of individual nodes. A few critical nodes (in our 
data, Argentina and Ireland) play the unusual role of switching between super-spreader during 
periods of stress and a super-absorber during periods of calm. Markets with these properties 
deserve to be watched carefully, with inoculation plans in place for adapting to changing 
circumstances (for example, restrictions on flows to and from those markets).  
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There are also markets which seem to be reliably either super-spreaders (the US) or super-
absorbers. Super-absorbers are valuable allies in the bid to reduce the transmission of shocks 
between markets. These markets are also those that perhaps deserve particular attention, because 
if they were to break down, the system might become disproportionately less stable as shocks 
propagate through the more expansive routes (this is a form of the robust-but-fragile nature of the 
network). All this points to the complexity of the financial networks in place, and indeed their 
evolution. However, it does not necessarily support means to reduce this complexity. Instead, the 
complexity reveals a rich tapestry of relationships that underpin the development of financial 
markets and the distribution of shocks. We propose that the first step is to understand this 
complexity.  
The disadvantages of reducing complexity (that is, trying to enact policies that force a more 
random structure on the network) include that this may restrict or reduce the potential for emerging 
markets to develop in the shortest possible time frame. The role of a regional hub in developing 
financial markets appears to be important. The results in this paper support the development of 
policies aimed at inoculation of important nodes. Indeed, there is a significant danger that 
constraining the form of one network through regulation may simply lead to the unwanted 
transmissions through another network that connects economies. For example, increased capital 
requirements on banks tie banking networks and sovereign bond networks more closely together 
and increased equity requirements have the potential to do the same for banking networks and 
equity markets. This also raises the somewhat more difficult proposition of policy coordination 
across different arms of the policy making community, to ensure the coordination of financial 
regulation with monetary and fiscal policy making.  
The financial links between economies are certainly more complex than those established simply 
through equity markets. The challenge to researchers and policy makers is to develop analytically 
tractable tools that reveal the complexity of the multiple layers of financial interconnectedness 
between economies through different asset markets and potentially different players. Sovereign 
bond networks will differ from equity market networks (see Dungey et al. 2017). Real economy 
networks such as trade networks, or input-output production networks as in Pesaran and Yang 
(2016), will be tied to financial networks, but the weights on the nodes are likely to be quite 
different, and may involve nodes which are not included in all layers. In the future understanding 
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the roles of nodes in different layers of the network may help to understand how effective policy 
interventions may be targeted at nodes that play critical roles in transmitting between layers to 
contain crisis events (or even to spread crisis events in a way that reduces their impact on individual 
layers and/or nodes). A recent step in this direction can be found in the multi-country, multi-market 
network analysis of Magkonis and Tsopanakis (2018). 
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